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Age-based Norms, Population Aging and Inequality in Japan 
1. Japan's aging dilemma 
Aging affects societies at different paces. Japan's population is aging much 
faster than advanced Western European countries or the USA. The elderly in 
Japan accounted for only 7.1 percent of the total population in 1970, but by 
1994, it had almost doubled to 14.1 percent. Today about 22.8% of the total 
population is over age 65. 
Rapid aging presents particular problems. Policy-makers need to be 
aware of possible consequences of aging, so that they can make appropriate 
decisions ahead of time. Japan is the first country to face such a rapid shift in 
population. It has no place to look for advice and few countries to analyze. On 
top of that there is not much time to implement adjustments in policies. Current 
Japanese welfare and health care systems were designed with the assumption 
of economic and demographic growth. So the crucial task for Japanese policy 
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Figure 1. Time taken for number of persons over 65 to increase from 7 to 14% of population 
Source: United Nations, The Aging of Populations and its Economic and Social Implication (1956); 
United Nations, World Population Prospects (2008) 
makers in the near future will be to reform society so that it is less dependent on 
demographic growth factors. To slow population decline Japan must create an 
environment where the desire for children is not thwarted by income inequality 
and other economic factors. On the other hand, Japan is a leader in the aging 
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population race, and it has already developed a number of policies to care for 
its dependent population. As there is no precedent of such rapid population 
aging, Japan will require a period of trial and error, but later, it may become an 
example for other developed countries. 
Falling fertility rates contribute to aging at least as much as increase in 
life expectancy. Employment of women into low-paid jobs and the lack of 
legislative and social base to support working mothers led to further decline 
in birth rates: TFR fell to 1.91 in 1975, 1.76 in 1985, 1.42 in 1995, and 1.26 in 
2005. 
Japanese society was known for its high social securitY and life-time 
employment practices. However aging of the population makes this system 
more and more difficult to sustain. Still, there is significant pressure on 
the government to ensure that employment systems provide high level of 
employment stability. Aging forces society to create "shock absorbers" that 
would take the first hit in the case of economic downturn and low labor 
demand. The confrontation between the traditional and neoliberal factions led 
to a situation where aging made the traditional age-seniority system difficult 
to sustain, yet the system could not be easily abolished. Thus, aging created a 
need to distinguish between people who benefit from employment stability and 
those who don't. Similarly, regions with weaker economies are used as "shock 
absorbers" to maintain stability in metropolitan areas. 
Aging population is changing the face of Japanese society in a number 
of complex, interrelated ways (Figure 1). It affects labor market, deepens 
the differences between the regular and irregular workers and contributes 
to regional disparities. Furthermore, aging is often used as an excuse for 
deregulation coveted for a long. time by neo-liberal politicians. Singling out the 
effect of aging on every aspect of the society is very difficult because of the 
complex nature of the processes involved. However, it is still possible to trace 
general trends when reliable data is available. This paper explores three central 
questions related to population aging: 1) how is aging changing the social 
inequality patterns in Japan? 2) How does aging affect employment and social 
security principles established long ago? 3) How does aging influence regional 
disparities? 
Figure 1: Aging and Inequality 
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2. Was Japan ever an egalitarian society? 
Before making conclusions about how aging population changes the 
face of social inequality it is necessary to make it clear what the face of social 
inequality in Japan was when its population was relatively young. For a long 
period of time Japan was considered to be a highly egalitarian, conflict-free 
mass-middle class society (Murakami 1977, 1979, 1980; Vogel1963). The level 
of inequality was the lowest among OECD countries (Sawyer 1976). 
Post-war development and increased educational attainment helped many 
young people move up in class the ownership of basic products, once reserved 
only for elite, expanded (Gordon 1993). 
Most importantly, demographics contributed to the acceptance of the 
idea of an egalitarian society. Rapid population growth maintained the 
triangular shape of the population pyramid. This fact, combined with age-
seniority, contributed significantly to the idea of equal society. Population 
growth itself didn't make everyone equal, however, the triangular shape of 
population pyramid fitted well with the social ladder contributing to the image 
of an egalitarian society. Differences between individuals were explained by 
number of years worked. This experience-based inequality was not considered 
problematic. Young people could expect to be promoted and enjoy the benefits 
~ older people did, because younger generations continued to fill the lowest steps 
of the social ladder. In a society emphasizing age-seniority, it was easy to accept 
that older people had more power and wealth than young people, especially if 
promotion was assured. 
2.3 Reasons to doubt the veracity of mass-middle class idea 
As later controversies show, these ideological debates about the new 
mass-middle focused on ideals to achieve rather than objective reality. 
Recently, scholars re-analyzed the raw data from national surveys and reached 
conclusions that Japan was never as egalitarian as it seemed. (Ishizaki's 1983, 
Tachibanaki 1998, Tachibanaki and Yagi 1994, Ishikawa 1991, 1994). 
Economist Fumio Ohtake (1998, 2005) argued that recent increases in 
inequality are explained mainly by inequality between generations and aging. 
As inequality tends to be greater in older cohorts, more older people will 
contribute to higher inequality. Sociologist Sawako Shirahase (2006), on the 
other hand, notes that it is also important to consider changes in household 
patterns. The number of single or couple-only households is growing, and 
elderly people are now less likely to get support from families. While both 
arguments are true, there seem to be other ways in which aging influences 
inequality in Japanese society. One of them is consciousness. 
2.4 Inequality consciousness and demography 
Something must have happened in people's minds that transformed their 
understanding of whether the society is egalitarian or not. Shirahase (IBID) tells 
us about an "explosion of inequality-consciousness" that occurred during late 
1990s. That "inequality-consciousness" is not necessarily tied to statistics and 
Gini coefficient, but reflects instead people's concerns with the present state of 
things. 
This "explosion of inequality consciousness" occurred in the late 1990s 
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and not earlier because that period marked the important change in the old-
to-young ratio. As the number of the aged increased, being older no longer 
guaranteed a privileged status in society. This was first of all due to the fact that 
the number of those who are supposed to be "privileged" increased to the point 
that their privileged status could no longer be guaranteed. Consequently, even 
though Japan displayed better results than other countries in some inequality 
studies, it is obvious that the idea of homogeneous society should be subject to 
serious reservations. Below I discuss the effect of aging on inequality in two 
other areas of Japanese life: employment and regional disparities. 
3. Aging diminishes employment 
Employment dualism and unemployment are regarded as top reasons for 
Japan's rising inequality by many researchers (Tachibanaki 1998; Weathers 
2009). In this section I consider how aging reshapes the Japanese labor market 
by decreasing the relative numbers of young workers. How does labor market 
respond to decreased numbers of new recruits? Common sense suggests that 
decrease in supply of young workers will decrease unemployment. However, 
the example of Japan as well as many European countries shows otherwise. 
The answer may partly lie in Japanese corporate culture, in particular - the age-
seniority system. Not long ago, skeptics argued huge labor shortages were 
coming, while optimists hoped the unemployment problem would be finally 
solved. PaulS. Hewitt (2002) was one of them: 
"Problems of unemployment that dominated social thinking in the 
twentieth century will soon give way to the social crisis oflabor shortages." 
Similar opinions were expressed even earlier by Richman (1990) among 
other scholars and journalists. But today Japan does not seem to have a labor 
shortage (except in very particular fields like health-care and farming). The 
job-offers-to-seekers ratio ("kyujinbairitsu") continues to fall, and many 
employees are continuously laid-off. As discussed below, rising labor costs 
forced enterprises to consider several ways of reducing these costs. Individuals 
who were fired or forced into irregular employment are not the only ones who 
suffered. It is more and more difficult to get promotions and make ends meet 
for regular workers as well. However, because irregular employees are best 
examples of the "working poor" and because it is easier to trace the effect of 
aging on irregular employment and unemployment, I will focus on these issues. 
3. 1 Age seniority system - a pyramid scheme? 
The age seniority system was based on the principle of paying relatively 
low wages to new comers. In exchange, workers were guaranteed promotion 
and salary increases with time. If a worker changed jobs, he had to restart at a 
low level. Thus loyal workers, who dedicated their lives to the company, were 
most rewarded, often ending up in management or top-management positions 
after 20-40 years of service. In postwar Japan the system allowed enterprises to 
grow fast by hiring large cohorts of young workers (Ogoshi 2006). During the 
rapid economic growth period, more and more young cheap workers were hired 
every year. This permitted higher salaries for older workers, who supervised the 
0 
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new-comers. Japan's population pyramid in 1950-1960 almost perfectly fit the 
hierarchy pyramid of enterprises, which provided life-time employment (Figure 
4). With certain reservations, it can be argued that the age-seniority system is a 
pyramid scheme highly dependent on cheap new labor. 
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Figure 4: Population pyramids of 1950 and 2010 and social hierarchy pyramid. 
Source: NIPSSR. 2010. Population Statistics of Japan 
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What is happening to this age-seniority pyramid, as the demographic 
structure of the population changes? The major concern with aging is the 
retirement of baby-boomers, - people born right after the war, in years I 946-
1947. Problems caused by aging are often described in terms of growing 
burdens on pension and health insurance systems. But it won't be until 
the year 2012 that baby-boomers will reach age of 65 and retire en masse, 
creating additional burden on pension and insurance systems. Meanwhile, it 
is interesting to look at workplaces.- As mentioned above, the 1950 population 
pyramid fitted almost exactly the hierarchy pyramid of most public and private 
enterprises. Under the age seniority principle, newcomers could expect to be 
promoted almost automatically as they reached appropriate age (Ogoshi 2006; 
Rebick 2005). 
The 2010 population pyramid no longer corresponds to the hierarchical 
structure of enterprises. The middle layers of the triangle are no longer able to 
accommodate all the workers who reached "appropriate" age for promotion. 
What happens to those outside the red full-time employment triangle? All the 
workers who cannot be supported in a traditional full-time employment age-
seniority system are hired or re-hired on contractual basis or are let go. Older 
workers, who are rehired on contracts when they reach age 50-55, make up 
for lower numbers of new recruits and provide cheap, experienced labor. In 
factories where emphasis is put on physical endurance, the preference is given 
to young. In the very end there are employees who are able to maintain their 
positions, employees who are hired on contracts and those who are let go (Lonien 
2003). The above pyramids are not an exact representation of absolute figures 
in full time and part-time employment, but are rather an illustration of trends in 
Japan's labor market. 
Note also that the enterprise hierarchy pyramid has changed in its shape 
as well. The enterprises have stopped promoting everyone according to age 
and significantly reduced the number of managerial positions (Sako and Sato 
1997; Hassard and Morris 2008). The enterprise hierarchy pyramid has become 
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narrower, especially at the top. 
3.3 Reaction of the corporations 
Neither the aging of the Japanese work force nor the increasing longevity 
of workers has led corporations to adjust their thinking about how old is too 
old. In the seniority-based wage system, an aging workforce equates to a wage 
increases. Japanese enterprises are seeking to cut labor costs, and so cease 
hiring young people and take any opportunity to cut expensive older personnel. 
Companies offer money as an incentive, often sweetening or accelerating 
irregular workers, who are the best illustrations of working poor in Japan. That 
is why I will focus on how aging increases irregular labor, and therefore widens 
the gap between regular and irregular workers. 
Regular workers over 45 years old 
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so preoccupied by labor costs? While collapse of the bubble economy as 
well as recent economic recessions and low consumption played vital roles, 
demographic factors are also very important. Seniority-based life-time 
employment system with high salaries for older workers increases labor costs 
dramatically as the proportion of older workers increases. In spite of attempts to 
introduce performance-based promotion systems, age-seniority remains largely 
intact in many enterprises. Under that system, a person is rewarded based 
on age and years of employment. The problem is that as the number of older 
workers within a company grows, this age-seniority system becomes more and 
more difficult to maintain (Boscaro, Gatti, Raveri 1991; Comad 2009). The life 
of the regular employees changes as well. It became more difficult for regular 
workers to walk up the career ladder and get promotions and regular salary 
increases. However, it is undeniable that regular workers are better-off then 
25% 
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Figure S:Percentage of regular workers over 45 years old in enterprises 
Source: Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare. Basic statistic survey on wages. (2008) 
In response to labor force aging acommpained by swelling labor costs, 
enterprises took steps to reduce expenses. In particular many had their personnel 
expenses fixed. To stay within the fixed amount of personnel expenses the 
companies I) ceased hiring or hire fewer young workers, 2) switched (partly) 
from age-seniority to performance based principle 3) hired easily dismissible 
non-regular workers (hiseiki) who are not subject to the age-seniority principle 
4) tried to force as many older workers as possible into retirement and possibly 
rehire them as contractual or part-time workers. All of the four policies of 
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the enterprises directed to cut the labor costs lead either to unemployment or 
increased ratio of irregular jobs. 
Figure 5 above shows that the intensity in older workers increase continued 
strongly until 1997 but diminished thereafter. This trend cannot be explained 
by an increased proportion of young workers because of aging and decreasing 
labor demand. The only explanation is that older workers were removed from 
their jobs. Policies undertaken by enterprises such as fixing labor budgets and 
removing older employees, increased unemployment and labor-market-dualism, 
a situation where full-time and contractual workers receive significantly 
different treatment and salaries while often doing basically the same job. Two 
studies (Genda and Kondo 2003; Genda 2005) show that enterprises with 
more middle-aged and older workers tend to limit labor demand for youth. 
Consequently, aging within such enterprises progresses further. In this sense, 
aging in Japan's specific environment has a negative influence on labor demand, 
expecially for young workers. 
According to a Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare survey of enterprises 
(MHLW 2006a), reducing labor costs is the most important reason why 
enterprises hire non-regular workers (71% of respondents). This number was 
higher in 2006 than in a similar 2001 survey, suggesting that the corporations 
were even more committed to labor cost cutting in 2006 than during the 200 I 
downturn. 
Jones (2008) also shows that there is a strong negative correlation between 
the rise in part-time employment and wage growth by industry. Retail sales, 
restaurants and hotels, medical and nursing care and other services which 
are the four service industries with the largest increases in part-timers - also 
experienced the largest wage declines. 
3.4 New class division 
When resources available for distribution are limited, there are two 
options: 1) decrease everyone's share, so that the amount distributed equals 
to the amount of resources available, or 2) differentiate levels of benefits. It 
seems that Japan is pursuing the second path. Higher labor costs, associated 
with aging, forced the companies to let go some workers and keep some others 
on the life-time career track. Are there limits to cost cutting? Obviously there 
are. In order to maintain know-how, sustain the image of the enterprise and so 
on, companies must have permanent workers. The division of population into 
regular workers and part-timers is a contemporary variant of class division. The 
division is mostly forced and artificial, but to justify it, the former ruling Liberal 
Democratic Party used the neoliberal "Get what you deserve" or "Everyone 
who makes effort is rewarded" ideological base. The reality, however, is that 
no matter how hard one works, a place in full-time employment is no longer 
guaranteed, as there are simply not enough "chairs to sit on for everyone" (Genda 
2005). The new government formed by the Democratic Party of Japan proposes 
a bill that will make dispatched workers illegal in manufacturing. This seems 
to be a good place to start, but whether policies to reduce labor market dualism 
will be effective is still a question as long as aging and associated increases in 
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labor costs progress. 
Labor market dualism in Japan divides workers into groups, making 
it difficult for them to act uniformly to protect their interests. Non-regular 
employees seldom have protection from labor unions, while full-time workers 
are always told they should be happy with what they have. The difference 
between permanent and non-regular workers is one of the features that 
constitute classes in modem Japan. Being members of different classes, the 
workers do not consider themselves to be in the same boat. 
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Figure 6: Share of non-regular workers 
Source: Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications Statistics Bureau, The Special Swvey of the Labour 
Force Survey (February from 1985 to 2001), and Labour Force Survey (from 2002 to 2008) 
Note : Non-regular employees include part-time workers, albeit's temporary workers, dispatched workers, 
contract workers, entrusted workers and other non-regular workers. 
3.5 Will inequality between regular and non-regular workers progress? 
What is interesting to note is that between 1990-2008, the ratio of older 
workers in enterprises was highly correlated (R=O.S) with the increase in the 
share of irregular workers. It may be argued that other factors like economic 
crises and recession might have influenced the labor market; but even when 
controlling for GDP and GDP growth, high correlation (R=O.S) is observed. 
This leads to the conclusion that labor market deregulation laws are an 
inevitable arrangement to allow business to shed the workforce that does 
not fit in the shrinking triangle of corporate hierarchy. Japanese enterprises, 
represented by Japan Business Federation (Keidanren) have put pressure on 
government to relax labor regulations and introduce flexible-employment. The 
"Tripartite Agreement on Employment issues" (Keidanren, 2002) emphasized 
the necessity of cutting labor costs and pressures labor to adopt "more diverse 
employment patterns", "using private job placement agencies" (haken), and 
"actively promoting trial employment and tailor-made vocational training." 
This agreement eventually developed into further deregulation of labor laws in 
2004. "New Directions for the Japanese-Style Employment System" (Keidanren 
2007) emphasizes the aging population problem and concludes that because of 
aging "people desire various types of employment and more flexible options." 
The foreword ofthe document says: 
"To respond to this changing business environment, elements of the 
Japanese-style management and the employment system behind it that must be 
preserved should be retained, but at the same time there should be awareness 
that the necessary changes must be made. " 
Reading the document, one is fully convinced that "must be retained" 
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practices include hard work and full devotion to the company, while "changes 
that must be made" include abolition of industry-based minimum-wage, 
introduction of flexible employment patterns, deregulation in dispatch labor 
related laws, and abolition of the age-seniority principle. In simple words, aging 
was used as an excuse to pass the deregulation laws to allow the enterprises to 
deal with swelling labor costs. 
On another account, the ratio of older workers in big enterprises is 
negatively correla!ed with the job-offers-to-seekers ratio (R=-0.5). These 
findings support the claim that companies with older workforce tend to limit 
hiring full-time employees (Genda 2003). 
Inequality will increase income differences between regular-employed 
workers, contractual workers, part-timers, and "freeters" at retirement age. 
People who retire from regular employment usually enjoy: 1) really high 
salaries just before retirement, 2) high retirement bonuses 3) a high level of 
savings. Non-regular workers, on the other hand, are usually cut-off much 
earlier than retirement age, do not get bonuses and often have no savings, 
as they work for only 40% of regular workers' salary (MHLW 2008a). The 
practice of hiring part-time workers increased from the 1970s and the numbers 
of non-regular workers has grown since then (OECD 2008). By the year 2020, 
when the first wave of workers employed on a non-regular basis will reach 
retirement age, inequality between the two groups will become even more 
apparent. The Liberal Democratic Party was criticized by the Democratic 
Party of Japan for promoting labor market dualism and inequality. Since DPJ 
took over the power, the situation has not yet shown any sign of improvement. 
How the new government will deal with rising inequality due to upside-down 
population pyramid remains to be seen. 
4. Regional Differences 
The population of 3 big metropolitan areas - Tokyo, Osaka and Nagoya 
has surpassed 50% of total Japan's population (Nikkei Shinbun 29 october 
2007). Since 2005 the population of Japan has decreased, but population decline 
is happening very unevenly across the regions. Some regions will maintain or 
· even increase population due to migration. 
But population loss in rural areas is very serious. One extreme example 
is Yubari-shi in Hokkaido. A coal mining town, its population grew rapidly, 
reaching 116,908 in 1960. However, when the mining industry became obsolete 
in the 1980s, the city faced problems. An attempt was made to convert to 
tourism. Huge investments were made, but eventually the project failed and 
the city entered bankruptcy. Young people fled and by 2005 the population 
declined to roughly a tenth of what it was just 50 years ago. Furthermore, 21 of 
27 elementary schools, 7 out of 10 middle-schools and 4 out of 6 high-schools 
closed. Factors in addition to aging, like mining industry downturn and unwise 
investments lead to financial crisis. However, this example clearly shows us that 
we do not know anything about city planning and regional development under 
conditions of population aging and decline. All the experience in regional and 
city development is built on the premise of economic and population growth. 
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As baby-boomers head for retirement and the number of old-elderly (people 
over 75 years old) grows, more and more municipalities will face Yubari-shi's 
problems. 
Table 1: Ratio of population over 65 by prefecture(%) 
Source: NIPSSR, Population projections for Japan (2006b), MHLW National Census (2005) 
Table I estimates the uneven distribution of older population across 
prefectures in 2035. In the 1950s the difference between the regions with most 
aged population (Shimane 7.6%) and youngest (Tokyo 3.5%) was around only 
4%. After 1975 the difference grew to 7%. During the period of high economic 
growth youth went out to big cities, abandoning rural areas, contributing to 
aging of population there. Since then, the difference between regions has 
gradually increased. Migration was also significant in the late 1990s. However, 
those young urban migrants will soon become part of the aged population 
themselves. Thus, it appears that during next 10-15 years the aging acceleration 
might be as significant in big cities as it is in rural areas. 
4. 1 Differences in birth rates 
Two factors contribute to aging in Japan: long lifetime expectancy and 
decreasing number of births. Japan's total fertility rate (TFR) has fallen as low 
as 1.26 in 2005. The government efforts to improve the situation do not seem 
to be very effective so far. This is not the first time Japanese society has faced 
decline in birth rates. A significant decline took place from 1950 to 1956 when 
Japan's TFR was more than halved, from 4.54 to 2.04 just like it did after 
1973, although at a slower pace. The significant difference is that in 1950-1956 
declining birth rates were universal across all prefectures and households. The 
demographic change we see now differs from region to region (Fig. 7). For 
instance, TFR is around 1.0 in Tokyo and Hokkaido while other prefectures like 
Okinawa (1.7), Tottori (1.56) and Shimane (1.50) maintain a TFR significantly 
higher than average (MHLW 2006b ). 
Sociologist Yamada Masahiro (2007), a government policy consultant, 
suggests that falling TFR is a problem requiring urgent and massive 
government intervention. He too notes that unlike previous birth rate declines, 
the decline after 1974is very uneven across the regions of Japan, which 
suggests that some regions are more suitable for child-rearing than others. 
Furthermore, this regional gap continues to grow. Atoh Makoto (2000) argues 
\0 
\0. 
that there is a positive correlation between fertility and female employment 
rates. His analysis is based on data from 13 OECD countries. The conclusion 
thus 1s that improving gender-equality policies and female employment would 
lead to increased birth rates. Sociologist Akagawa Manabu (2004) strongly 
opposes this idea. Akagawa believes that fall in the birth rates is inevitable 
and no policies can reverse the trend. Akagawa's critism of Atoh is based on 
the fact that including other countries would make the correlations statistically 
insignificant. Accordingly, government efforts should be directed to adapting to 
the new demographic environment rather than changing it (See Fig. 7). 
My point of view lies in between. Even if it is be very difficult to 
boost birth rates above replacement level, it should be possible to create an 
environment where people's wishes for creating family are not thwarted 
by economic problems. New laws and regulations will not help resolve the 
problem of low birth rates unless they are powerful enough to change the reality 
of Japanese corporate culture. You can increase maternal and paternal leave 
on paper, but Japanese employees do not take even half of holidays they have 
under current law (JIL 2002; MHLW 2004). Because traditionally in Japanese 
families the burden of child rearing falls almost exclusively on women, gender 
equality and female employment policies alone would not resolve the problem 
of low birth rates. Even though economic burdens are the top reason for not 
having children, young people do not use statistics to decide whether io have 
children or not. 
Correlation analysis of aging, expressed as the ratio of people over 65, and 
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birth rates (TFR) by region reveals that there is no significant relation between 
the two variables. Thus, while low birth rates should normally influence the 
level of aging, it seems that Japanese regional differences in aging are more due 
to migration than to differences in birth rates. 
4.2 Migration -subsidizing Tokyo, Osaka, Nagoya 
Aging is strongly correlated with shrinking of the population (Hattori 
2009). At first glance, this is too obvious to even mention, because mortality 
among older people is higher and older people are unlikely to bear children. 
However, closer analysis shows that it is not that population is shrinking in 
regions with higher ratio of older people because the mortality is so high and 
birth rates so low, but because people just move from such regions. Although, 
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the population of Japan started declining in 2005, the population of three 
metropolitan areas around Osaka, Tokyo, Nagoya is still one the rise due to 
migration (Fig. 8-9). 
There is a significant negative correlation between city and level of aging 
expressed by the ratio of citizens over 65 years old (Fig. 1 0). What this data 
means is pretty straight forward - rural areas with above-average birth rates still 
send their young people to metropolitan areas. Big cities like Tokyo, Nagoya, 
and Osaka benefit from this inflow. Meanwhile prefectures like Shimane, Fukui, 
Kagoshima, Fukushima and others that send their youth to big cities continue 
to age rapidly. The situation is even more serious for prefectures that already 
have high ratios of older people and low birth rates, such as Tokushima, Akita, 
Kochi and Hokkaido. The policies to alleviate the situation rarely seek global 
solutions. Instead they are often focused on things like attracting tourists and 
migrants to live. Advocates of "natural selection" both in Japan and outside 
suggest that there is no problem with letting the unattractive regions deteriorate 
and disappear, because it is natural for strong economies to survive and for 
weak ones to die out. (Herve le Bras 1998; Akagawa 2004; Wada 2007). 
However, such ideas do not take into account one very important thing - that 
"economically healthy" regions draw human resources from "economically ill" 
and aging regions. If the regions with above average birth-rates are allowed to 
fail, there will be no migration boost for Tokyo, Saitama and Osaka populations 
as their TFRs are far below national average- 1.0; 1.22; 1.22 respectively. 
Obviously, the differences in old-age dependency ratios will cause 
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Figure 10: Population size and aging 
Source: Cabinet Office, National Census, 2005 
differences in regional tax rates, number of schools, tax revenue levels, 
welfare and regional development (NIPSSR 2008). Regions with larger old-
age dependency ratio will have to spend more of their smaller budgets on 
support rather than development. The way to change the situation - government 
supported incentives and promotion of regions - seems to be a rather difficult 
issue in Japan. So far, governmental initiatives for offsetting rural-urban 
differences have not given significant results. 
5. Summary 
There are at least 3 ways in which aging has changed the patterns of 
inequality in Japanese society. The most obvious one is that as the ratio of the 
eldest cohorts increased, inequality levels increased as well, because inequality 
tends to be higher among older cohorts (Ohtake 2005). However, behind this 
obvious change there were many changes that are not usually associated with 
aging population, such· as labor market dualism. Aging of the population made 
the age-seniority system unsustainable and this lead to growing differentiation 
between full-time and irregular workers. Aging was also significant as an 
excuse for deregulation of labor laws. Inequality between regular and irregular 
workers was caused at least as much by aging as by the recession and economic 
factors. The differences in unemployment and underemployment rates across 
regions can also be explained by demographics. The oldest regions have higher 
unemployment rates which forces the youth to move to the metropolitan areas, 
subsidizing their populations. Growing inequality and irregular employment 
make it harder for young people to create families and raise children, a situation 
that leads to an old-age demographic trap. 
6. What can be done? 
Natural population shrinking is a recent phenomenon. For centuries 
humanity accumulated experience and knowledge about development and urban 
planning under the conditions of population growth. It has become a tradition 
in many cultures for younger generations to care for the old. Temporary 
population declines due to wars or disease are known, but such events did not 
tum the population pyramid up-side down. Population decline is very new, and 
a little is known how it could change living arrangements. Thus, it is important 
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10 
to monitor the changes and draw from Japanese experience to learn how aging 
and population shrinking change the society. 
First, it is obvious that Japan has to find policies to adequately deal 
with aging and decreasing population. The current social system is premised 
on a pyramid that can only be maintained under conditions of economic 
expansion and population growth. Currently the government is considering 
partly financing public pensions through taxes, because the pension funds are 
dwindling. Similar to pensions, health insurance depends on newcomers. It is 
just a matter of time before aging and shrinking population undermine such 
systems. Japan has already taken measures to alleviate the situation by gradually 
increasing pensionable age to 65 and reforming pension and insurance syste~. 
However, these are only temporary solutions. Unless population aging stops, 
other measures will be necessary. 
Unfortunately, many government policies as remedies for aging population 
burden the most vulnerable members of society. Recent examples are: 1) New 
"Medical care system for the elderly" (MHLW 2008b), which means less 
medical care for more money for persons aged over 75 years old; 2) Postponing 
retirement age (Takayama 2004); and 3) possibly increasing the consumption 
tax. 
Finally, perhaps the most importa11t issue is stratification of Japanese 
society. Both, the pressure to conserve and the pressure to change the age-
seniority and life-time employment principle were so strong that enterprises 
conserved it for some people and changed it for many others. This created 2 
separate classes - regular and irregular workers. This stratification deepened as 
many new types of irregular workers (arubaito, contract-workers, part-timers, 
dispatched workers etc.) were invented. Breaking the working class into smaller 
classes suppresses class consciousness and makes it much more difficult for 
people to stand for their rights. It is perhaps fair to say that aging was used by 
the state and enterprises as a convenient excuse to do what they wanted to do -
reduce labor costs and justify shrinking the welfare state. 
The key to reducing inequality caused by aging population is to treat it as a 
problem rather than as an excuse to sacrifice the welfare state and social justice. 
Instead of dividing society into winners and losers (read regular and irregular 
workers) and designating a part of society as shock absorbers, it is necessary 
to create an environment where anyone willing to work could exercise his or 
her potential. A possible solution to increasing labor dualism and inequality is 
to grant the same social security protection (including minimal wage, health 
insurance, matemaVpatemalleave, and holidays) to every employee regardless 
status. Similar policies were implemented in Netherlands that granted all 
workers same social security rights as full-time workers. At the same time, full-
time working hours were made more flexible, which narrowed the gap between 
full and part time workers (Bleijenbergh, Bruijn, Bussemaker 2004). The results 
were reduced unemployment and increasing birth rates. 
As for pensions, one option to consider is financing the system through 
taxes. The new government and Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama has promised 
to keep the consumption tax rate at current level, for at least 4 years. But the 
0 
..... 
questions of pension reform and health insurance remain. 
Japan still has a long way to go in improving childcare services and work-
life balance - the most important issues related to low birth rates. It is necessary 
to draw attention to people's feelings and aspiration for life. People do not make 
their life choices based on statistics, but in comparison with others around them. 
If one sees people having a hard time raising children and working, one is less 
likely to have children. On the other hand, if one sees other happy families with 
children, who are able to balance work and childcare regardless of their status, 
then it is very possible that many people who wish to have children will do so. 
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Age-based Norms, Population Aging and Inequality in Japan 
ANDRIY, Naumov 
Abstract: 
This paper analyzes challenges Japanese society faces due to population aging, especially the links 
between aging and rising inequality. Recently increased inequality between age cohorts can be explained by 
increased numbers in older cohorts. From this basic demographic fact, the paper traces how the effects of aging 
on inequality extend through household patterns, employment patterns, and regional differences. Analysis of 
Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare surveys shows links between the increased ratio of older workers and 
increased inequality due to use of irregular labor. The job-offers-to-seekers ratio (kyuujinbairitsu) was found to 
be negatively correlated with older population ratio. This suggests that regions with older populations tend to 
have less employment opportunities for the young, forcing them to migrate. Census data confirm that population 
of metropolitan areas continues to grow, even though Japan's total population has been declining since 2005. But 
even metropolitan areas with their below-average birth rates will experience very rapid aging within next two 
decades. The paper concludes by considering how differences in old-age dependency ratios will affect tax rates, 
education, tax revenues, welfare, and regional development. 
Key words : aging, population, inequality, labor dualism, regional 
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